Abstract. We investigate when non-dictatorial aggregation is possible from an algorithmic perspective. We consider the setting in which the members of a society take a position on a fixed collection of issues, where for each issue several different alternatives are possible, but the combination of choices must belong to a given set X of allowable voting patterns. Such a set X is called a possibility domain if there is an aggregator that is non-dictatorial, operates separately on each issue, and returns values among those cast by the society on each issue. We design a polynomialtime algorithm that decides, given a set X of voting patterns, whether or not X is a possibility domain. Furthermore, if X is a possibility domain, then the algorithm constructs in polynomial time such a non-dictatorial aggregator for X. We also design a polynomial-time algorithm that decides if X is a uniform possibility domain, that is, a possibility domain for which non-dictatorial aggregation is possible, uniformly for all issues and when restricted to any two positions for each issue. As in the case of possibility domains, the algorithm also constructs in polynomial time a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator, if one exists.
Introduction
The study of vote aggregation has occupied a central place in social choice theory. A fairly general framework for carrying out this study is as follows. There is a fixed collection of issues on each of which every member of a society takes a position, that is, for each issue, a member of the society can choose between a number of alternatives. However, not every combination of choices is allowed, which means that the vector of the choices made by a member of the society must belong to a given set X of allowable voting patterns, called feasible evaluations. The goal is to investigate properties of aggregators, which are functions that take as input the votes cast by the members of the society and return as output a feasible evaluation that represents the collective position of the society on each of the issues at hand. A concrete key problem studied in this framework is to determine whether or not a non-dictatorial aggregator exists, i.e., whether or not it is possible to aggregate votes in such a way that individual members of the society do not impose their voting preferences on the society. A set X of feasible evaluations is called a possibility domain if it admits a non-dictatorial aggregator; otherwise, X is called an impossibility domain. This framework is broad enough to account for several well-studied cases of vote aggregation, including the case of preference aggregation for which Arrow [1] established his celebrated impossibility theorem and the case of judgment aggregation [10] .
Much of the investigation of the existence of non-dictatorial aggregators has been carried out under two assumptions: (a) the aggregators are independent of irrelevant alternatives (IAA); and (b) the aggregators are conservative (also known as supportive). The IAA assumption means that the aggregator is an issue-by-issue aggregator, so that an IAA aggregator on m issues can be identified with an m-tuple (f 1 , . . . , f m ) of functions aggregating the votes on each issue. The conservativeness (or supportiveness) assumption means that, for every issue, the position returned by the aggregator is one of the positions held by the members of the society on that issue.
By now, there is a body of research on identifying criteria that characterize whether or not a given set X of feasible evaluations is a possibility domain. The first such criterion was established by Dokow and Holzman [8] in the Boolean framework, where, for each issue, there are exactly two alternatives (say, 0 and 1) for the voters to choose from. Specifically, Dokow and Holzman [8] showed that a set X ⊆ {0, 1} m is a possibility domain if and only if X is affine or X is not totally blocked. In informal terms, the notion of total blockedness, which was first introduced in [14] , asserts that any position on any issue can be inferred from any position on any issue. As regards the non-Boolean framework (where, for some issues, there may be more than two alternatives), Dokow and Holzman [9] extended the notion of total blockedness and used it to give a sufficient condition for a set X of feasible evaluations to be a possibility domain. Szegedy and Xu [17] used tools from universal algebra to characterize when a totally blocked set X of feasible evaluations is a possibility domain. A consequence of these results is that a set X of feasible evaluations is a possibility domain if and only if X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator or a ternary non-dictatorial aggregator; in other words, non-dictatorial aggregation is possible for a society of some size if and only if it is possible for a society with just two members or with just three members. This line of investigation was pursued further by Kirousis et al. [11] , who characterized possibility domains in terms of the existence of binary nondictatorial aggregators or ternary non-dictatorial aggregators of particular form.
The aforementioned investigations have characterized possibility domains (in both the Boolean framework and the non-Boolean framework) in terms of structural conditions. Our goal in this paper is to investigate possibility domains using the algorithmic lens and, in particular, to study the following algorithmic problem: given a set X of feasible evaluations, determine whether or not X is a possibility domain. Szegedy and Xu [17, Theorem 37] give algorithms for this problem, but these algorithms have very high running time; in fact, they run in exponential time, even when confined in the Boolean framework.
We design a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a set X of feasible evaluations (be it in the Boolean or the non-Boolean framework), determines whether or not X is a possibility domain. In addition, if X is a possibility domain, then the algorithm can also produce a binary non-dictatorial or a ternary non-dictatorial aggregator for X. Along the way, we also show that there is a polynomial-time algorithm for determining, given X, whether or not X is totally blocked. After this, we turn attention to uniform possibility domains, which were introduced in [11] and constitute a proper subclass of the class of possibility domains. Intuitively, uniform possibility domains are sets of feasible evaluations for which nondictatorial aggregation is possible, uniformly for all issues and when restricted to any two positions for each issue. In [11] , a tight connection was established between uniform possibility domains and constraint satisfaction by showing that multi-sorted conservative constraint satisfaction problems on uniform possibility domains are tractable, whereas such constraint satisfaction problems defined on all other domains are NP-complete. Here, using results of Carbonnel [6] , we give a polynomial-time algorithm for the following decision problem: given a set X of feasible evaluations (be it in the Boolean or the non-Boolean framework), determine whether or not X is a uniform possibility domain; moreover, if X is a uniform possibility domain, then the algorithm can produce a suitable uniform non-dictatorial aggregator for X.
The results reported here contribute to the developing field of computational social choice and pave the way for further exploration of algorithmic aspects of vote aggregation.
Preliminaries and Earlier Work

Possibility Domains
Suppose we have a fixed set I = {1, . . . , m} of issues. Assume that the possible position values of an individual (member of a society) for issue j are given by the finite set A j , where j = 1, . . . , m.
We assume that each A j has cardinality at least 2. If |A j | = 2 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we say we are in the binary or Boolean framework; otherwise we say that we are in the non-binary or non-Boolean framework.
An evaluation is any element of
A j denote a set of permissible or feasible evaluations. As a non-degeneracy condition, we assume that for each j = 1, . . . , m, the j-th projection X j of X, has at least two elements.
Let n ≥ 2 represent the number of individuals. We view the elements of X n as n × m matrices that represent the choices of all individuals over every issue.
The element x i j of such a matrix will be the choice of the i-th individual over the j-th issue, for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , m. The i-th row x i will represent the choices of the i-th individual over every issue, i = 1, . . . , n, and the j-th column x j the choices of every individual over the j-th issue, j = 1, . . . , m.
To aggregate a set of n feasible evaluations, we will use m-tuples of functions f = (f 1 , . . . , f m ), where f j : A n j → A j , j = 1, . . . , m. Such a m-tuple of functions will be called an (n-ary) aggregator for X if the following two conditions hold:
1.f = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) is conservative, i.e., if for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we have that We say that X has a non-dictatorial aggregator if, for some n ≥ 2, there is a n-ary non-dictatorial aggregator on X.
A set X of feasible evaluations is called a possibility domain if it has a nondictatorial aggregator. Otherwise, it is called an impossibility domain. A possibility domain is, by definition, one where aggregation is possible for societies of some cardinality, namely, the arity of a non-dictatorial aggregator.
The notion of an aggregator is akin to, but different from, the notion of a polymorphism -a fundamental notion in universal algebra (see Szendrei [18] ).
Let A be a finite non-empty set. A constraint language over A is a finite set Γ of relations of finite arities.
Let R be an m-ary relation on A. We say that a function f : A n → A is a polymorphism of R if the following condition holds:
where
In this case, we also say that R is closed under f or that f preserves R. Finally, we say that f is a polymorphism of a constraint language Γ if f preserves every relation R ∈ Γ .
A function f : A n → A is conservative if, for all a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ A, we have that f (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ {a 1 , . . . , a n }.
Clearly, if f :
A n → A is a conservative polymorphism of an m-ary relation R on A, then the m-tuplef = (f, . . . , f ) is an n-ary aggregator for R.
We say that a ternary operation f : A 3 → A on an arbitrary set A is a majority operation if for all x and y in A,
we also say that f is a minority operation if for all x and y in A,
We say that f : A n → A is a weak near-unanimity operation [12] if, for all x, y ∈ A, we have that
y).
In particular, a ternary weak near-unanimity operation is a function f : A 3 → A such that for all x, y ∈ A, we have that
Thus, the notion of a ternary weak near-unanimity operation is a common generalization of the notions of a majority operation and a minority operation.
We also say that a set X of feasible evaluations admits a majority (respectively, minority) aggregator if it admits a ternary aggregator every component of which is a majority (respectively, minority) operation. Clearly, X admits a majority aggregator if and only if there is a ternary aggregatorf = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) for X such that, for all j = 1, . . . , m and for all two-element subsets B j ⊆ X j , we have that f j ↾ B j = maj, where
Similarly, X admits a minority aggregator if and only if there is a ternary aggregatorf = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) for X such that, for all j = 1, . . . , m and for all two-element subsets B j ⊆ X j , we have that f j ↾ B j = ⊕, where
Finally, we say that X admits a ternary weak near-unanimity aggregatorf = (f 1 , . . . , f m ), if it admits a ternary aggregator every component of which is a weak near-unanimity operation, i.e. for all j = 1, . . . , m and for all x, y ∈ X j , we have that
It is known that in the Boolean framework a set X admits a majority aggregator if and only if X is a bijunctive logical relation, i.e., X is a subset of {0, 1} m that is the set of satisfying assignments of a 2CNF-formula. Moreover, X admits a minority aggregator if and only if X is an affine logical relation, i.e., X is a subset of {0, 1} m that is the set of solutions of linear equations over the two-element field (see Schaefer [15] ).
The following two theorems characterize possibility domains in the Boolean framework and in the non-Boolean framework, respectively. These results are the stepping stones towards showing that the following decision problem is solvable in polynomial time: given a set X of feasible evaluations, is X a possibility domain?
Theorem A (Dokow and Holzman [8] ) Let X ⊆ {0, 1} m be a set of feasible evaluations. The following two statements are equivalent.
-X is a possibility domain. -X is affine or X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator.
Theorem B (Kirousis et al. [11] ) Let X be a set of feasible evaluations. The following two statements are equivalent.
1. X is a possibility domain. 2. X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator, or a majority aggregator, or a minority aggregator.
Uniform Possibility Domains
We now turn our attention to a subclass of possibility domains, first defined in [11] , called uniform possibility domains. Letf = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) be an n-ary aggregator for X. We say thatf is a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator for X (of arity n) if, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m} and for every two-element subset B j ⊆ X j , it holds that
, . . . , n}. We say that X is a uniform possibility domain if it has a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity n.
Clearly, if X is a uniform possibility domain, then X is also a possibility domain. The converse, however, is not true. To see this, suppose that X is a cartesian product X = Y ×Z, where Y ⊆ l j=1 A j and Z ⊆ m j=l+1 A j , with 1 ≤ l < m. If Y or Z is an impossibility domain, then X is not a uniform possibility domain, although it is a possibility domain, as every Cartesian product of two sets is a possibility domain.
The next result provides a characterization of uniform possibility domain. It is the stepping stone towards showing that the following decision problem is solvable in polynomial time: given a set X of feasible evaluations, is X a uniform possibility domain?
Theorem C (Kirousis et al. [11] ) Let X be a set of feasible evaluations. The following two statements are equivalent.
1. X is a uniform possibility domain. 2. X admits a ternary weak near-unanimity aggregator.
Results
In this section, we show that there are polynomial-time algorithms for telling, given a set X of feasible evaluations, whether or not X is a possibility domain and whether or not X is a uniform possibility domain.
Tractability of Possibility Domains
As seen earlier, Theorems A and B provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a set X to be a possibility domain in the Boolean framework and in the nonBoolean framework, respectively. Admitting a binary non-dictatorial aggregator is a condition that appears in both these characterizations. Our first result asserts that this condition can be checked in polynomial time.
Theorem 1.
There is a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the following problem: given a set X of feasible evaluations, determine whether or not X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator and, if it does, produce one.
Proof. We will show that the existence of a binary non-dictatorial aggregator on X is tightly related to connectivity properties of a certain directed graph H X that we now introduce.
If X ⊆ m j=1 A j is a set of feasible evaluations, then H X is the following directed graph:
-The vertices of H X are the pairs of distinct elements u, u ′ ∈ X j , for j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Each such vertex will usually be denoted by uu ′ j . When the coordinate j is understood from the context, we will often be dropping the subscript j, thus denoting such a vertex by uu ′ . Also, if u ∈ X j , for some j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we will often use the notation u j to indicate that u is an element of X j . = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) be a binary aggregator on X.
Assume that uu
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows from the definitions and the fact thatf is conservative. Indeed, if uu
, such that there is no total evaluation in X that extends (u k , v ′ l ) and agrees with z or with z ′ on every coordinate. Consider the total evaluation
, which is in X becausef is an aggregator on X. Since each f j is conservative, we must have that f j (z j , z
and agrees with z or with z ′ on every coordinate. The second part of the lemma follows from the first part by induction.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 2. The set X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator if and only if the directed graph H X is not strongly connected.
Proof. We first show that if X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator, then H X is not strongly connected. In the contrapositive form, we show that if H X is strongly connected, then X admits no binary non-dictatorial aggregator. This is an easy consequence of the preceding Lemma 1. Indeed, assume that H X is strongly connected and letf = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) be a binary aggregator on X. Take two distinct elements x and x ′ of X 1 . Sincef is conservative, we have that
We claim that f j ↾ X j = pr 2 1 ↾ X j , for every j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. To see this, let y and y ′ be two distinct elements of X j , for some j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Since H X is strongly connected, we have that xx
We claim that f j ↾ X j = pr 2 2 ↾ X j , for every j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. To see this, let y and y ′ be two distinct elements of X j , for some j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Since H X is strongly connected, we have that yy
For the converse, assume that H X is not strongly connected and let uu ′ k , vv ′ l be two vertices of H X such that there is no path from uu
, and there is no edge from a vertex in V 1 to a vertex in V 2 . We will now define a binary aggregatorf = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) and prove that it is non-dictatorial, which will complete the proof.
Given z, z ′ ∈ X, we set f j (z j , z
, and we set f j (z j , z
Thus, what remains to be proved is that if z, z, ′ ∈ X, thenf (z, z ′ ) ∈ X. For this, we will show that iff (z, z ′ ) ∈ X, then there is an edge from an element of V 1 to an element of V 2 , which is a contradiction.
Assume that q =f (z, z ′ ) ∈ X. Let K be a minimal subset of {1, . . . , m} such that q ↾ K cannot be extended to a total evaluation w in X that agrees with z or with z ′ on {1, . . . , m} \ K (i.e., if j ∈ {1, . . . , m} \ K, then w j = z j or
We will arrive at a contradiction by showing that z s z ′ s → z t z ′ t , i.e., there is an edge z s z ′ s to z t z ′ t in H X . Consider the set K \ {t}. By the minimality of K, there is a total evaluation w in X that extends q ↾ K \ {t} and agrees with z or with z ′ outside K \ {t}. In particular, we have that w s = q s = z s and w t = z t . Similarly, by considering the set K \ {s}, we find that there is a total evaluation w ′ in X that extends q ↾ K \ {s} and agrees with z or with z ′ outside K \ {s}. In particular, we have that w ′ s = z ′ s and w t = q t = z ′ t . Note that w and w ′ agree on Y \ {s, t}. Since q ↾ K does not extend to a total evaluation that agrees with z or with z ′ outside K, we conclude that there is no total evaluation y in X that extends z s z ′ t and agrees with w or with w ′ on every coordinate. Consequently, z s z ′ s → z t z ′ t , thus we have arrived at a contradiction. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
⊓ ⊔
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 1. Given a set X of feasible evaluations, the graph H X can be constructed in time bounded by a polynomial in the size |X| of X (in fact, in time O(|X| 5 ). There are well-known polynomial-time algorithms for testing if a graph is strongly connected and, in case it is not, producing the strongly connected components of the graph (e.g., Kosaraju's algorithm presented in Sharir [16] and Tarjan's algorithm [19] ). Consequently, by Lemma 2, there is a polynomial-time algorithm for determining whether or not a given set X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator. Moreover, if X admits such an aggregator, then one can be constructed in polynomialtime from the strongly connected components of H X via the construction in the proof of Lemma 2.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the existence of a binary non-dictatorial aggregator on X is closely related to the total blockedness of X. More precisely, the following result was proved in [11] .
Theorem D (Kirousis et al. [11] ) Let X be a set of feasible evaluations. The following two statements are equivalent.
1. X is totally blocked. 2. X admits no binary non-dictatorial aggregator.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and Theorem D.
Corollary 1.
There is a polynomial-time algorithm for the following decision problem: given a set X ⊆ {0, 1} m of feasible evaluations, is X totally blocked?
Furthermore, by combining Theorem 1 with Theorem A, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for the following decision problem: given a set X ⊆ {0, 1} m of feasible evaluations in the Boolean framework, determine whether or not it is a possibility domain.
Proof. By Theorem A, we have to check, given X ⊆ {0, 1} m , if X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator or X is affine. Theorem 1 tells that the first condition can be checked in polynomial time. Furthermore, X is affine if and only if the function ⊕(x, y, z) is a polymorphism of X [15] , hence the second condition can also be checked in polynomial time (in fact, cubic time).
We now turn to the problem of detecting possibility domains in the nonBoolean framework.
Theorem 3. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the following problem: given a set X of feasible evaluations, determine whether or not X is a possibility domain and, if it is, produce a binary non-dictatorial aggregator for X or a ternary non-dictatorial aggregator for X.
Proof. In view of Theorem B and Theorem 1, it suffices to show that there is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given X, detects whether or not X admits a majority aggregator or a minority aggregator, and, if it does, produces such an aggregator.
Let X be a set of feasible evaluations, where I = {1, . . . , m} is the set of issues and A j , j = 1, . . . , m, are the sets of the position values. We define the disjoint union A of the sets of position values as
We also setX
We will show that we can go back-and-forth between conservative majority or minority polymorphisms forX and majority or minority aggregators for X. First, assume that f : A n → A is a conservative polymorphism forX. We define the m-tuplef = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) of n-ary functions f 1 , . . . , f m as follows: if x 1 j , . . . , x n j ∈ A j , for j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, then we set
where y j is such that f ((x 1 j , j), . . . , (x n j , j)) = (y j , j). Such a y j exists and is one of the x i j 's because f is conservative, and hence f ((x 1 j , j), . . . , (x n j , j)) ∈ {(x 1 j , j), . . . , (x n j , j)}. It is easy to see thatf is an aggregator for X. Moreover, if f is a majority or a minority operation onX, thenf is a majority or a minority aggregator on X.
Next, assume thatf = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) is a majority or a minority aggregator for X. We define a ternary function f : A 3 → A as follows. Let (x, j), (y, k), (z, l) be three elements of A.
• if at least two of (x, j), (y, k), (z, l) are equal to each other, then we set
iff is a majority aggregator on X, and we set
iff is a minority aggregator on X;
• otherwise, we set f ((x, j), (y, k), (z, l)) = (x, j).
It is easy to see that iff is a majority or a minority aggregator for X, then f is a conservative majority or a conservative minority polymorphism onX. It follows that X admits a majority or a minority aggregator if and only ifX is closed under a conservative majority or minority polymorphism. Now, Bessiere et al. [2] and Carbonnel [7] design polynomial-time algorithms that detect if a given constraint language Γ has a conservative majority or a conservative minority polymorphism, respectively, and, when it has, compute such a polymorphism. In our case, we only need to apply these results to Γ = {X}. ⊓ ⊔
Tractability of Uniform Possibility Domains
We now focus on uniform possibility domains. We begin by bringing into the picture a result by Carbonnel [6] , which was obtained in the context of conservative constraint satisfaction.
Recall that a constraint language is a finite set Γ of relations of finite arities over a finite non-empty set A. The conservative constraint satisfaction problem for Γ , denoted by c-CSP(Γ ) is the constraint satisfaction problem for the constraint language Γ that consists of the relations in Γ and, in addition, all unary relations on A. Bulatov [3, 4] established a dichotomy theorem for the computational complexity of c-CSP(Γ ). Specifically, he showed that if for every two-element subset B of A, there is a conservative polymorphism f of Γ such that f is binary and f ↾ B ∈ {∧, ∨} or f is ternary and f ∈ {maj, ⊕}, then c-CSP(Γ ) is solvable in polynomial time; otherwise, c-CSP(Γ ) is NP-complete. Carbonnel [6] showed that the aforementioned conditions that determine the boundary of the dichotomy for c-CSP(Γ ) can be checked in polynomial time. This result, which we state rigorously below, will be of interest to us in the sequel.
Theorem E (Carbonnel [6] ) There is a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the following problem: given a constraint language Γ on a set A, determine whether or not for every two-element subset B ⊆ A, there is a conservative polymorphism f of Γ such that f is binary and f ↾ B ∈ {∧, ∨} or f is ternary and f ↾ B ∈ {maj, ⊕}. Moreover, if such a polymorphism exists, then the algorithm produces one in polynomial time.
The final result of this section is about the complexity of detecting uniform possibility domains.
Theorem 4.
There is a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the following problem: given a set X of feasible evaluations, determine whether or not X is a uniform possibility domain and, if it is, produce a ternary weak near-unanimity aggregator for X.
Proof. In what follows, given a two-element set B, we will arbitrarily identify its elements with 0 and 1. Consider the functions ∧ 3 and ∨ 3 on {0, 1} 3 , where
It is easy to see that the only ternary, conservative, weak near-unanimity functions on {0, 1} are ∧ 3 , ∨ 3 , maj, and ⊕. This fact will be used in the sequel. We will also make use of the following lemma, which also gives an alternative formulation of the criterion in Bulatov's dichotomy theorem for the conservative constraint satisfaction problem [3, 4] . Lemma 3. Let Γ be a constraint language on set A. The following two statements are equivalent.
1. For every two-element subset B ⊆ A, there exists a conservative polymorphism f of Γ (which, in general, depends on B), such that f is binary and f ↾ B ∈ {∧, ∨} or f is ternary and f ↾ B ∈ {maj, ⊕}. 2. Γ has a ternary, conservative, weak near-unanimity polymorphism.
Proof. (1 ⇒ 2) Given a two-element subset B ⊆ A and a binary conservative polymorphism f of Γ such that f ↾ B ∈ {∧, ∨}, define f ′ to be the ternary operation such that f ′ (x, y, z) = f (f (x, y), z), for all x, y, z ∈ A. It is easy to see that f ′ is a conservative polymorphism of Γ as well and also that f ′ ↾ B ∈ {∧ (3) , ∨ (3) }. From the hypothesis and the preceding argument, it follows that, for each two-element subset B ⊆ A, there exists a ternary conservative polymorphism f of Γ (which, in general, depends on B) such that f ↾ B ∈ {∧ (3) , ∨ (3) , maj, ⊕}. For each two-element subset B ⊆ A, select such a polymorphism and let f 1 , . . . , f N , N ≥ 1, be an enumeration of all these polymorphisms. Obviously the restriction of each f i to its respective two element subset is a weak near-unanimity operation.
Consider the '⋄' operator (introduced in [5] and later on used in [11] ), which takes as input two ternary operations f, g : A 3 → A and returns as output a ternary operation f ⋄ g defined by (f ⋄ g)(x, y, z) := f (g(x, y, z), g(y, z, x), g(z, x, y)).
It is again easy to see that, if f, g are conservative polymorphisms of Γ , then so is (f ⋄ g). Also, it can be verified that if B is a two-element subset of A such that f ↾ B or g↾ B is a weak near-unanimity operation, then so is (f ⋄ g)↾ B (for details, see [11] ).
Consider now the iterated diamond operation h with
By the preceding discussion, h is a conservative polymorphism such that h↾ B is a weak near-unanimous operation for every two-element subset B of A, hence h itself is a weak near-unanimity, conservative, ternary operation of Γ . (2 ⇒ 1) Let h be a ternary, conservative, weak near-unanimity polymorphism of Γ . As mentioned earlier, the only ternary, weak near-unanimity functions on {0, 1} 3 are ∧ (3) , ∨ (3) , maj, ⊕. Thus, for every two-element subset B ⊆ A, we have that h↾ B ∈ {∧ (3) , ∨ (3) , maj, ⊕}.
If there is a two-element subset B ⊆ A such that h↾ B ∈ {∧ (3) , ∨ (3) }, then consider the binary function g defined by g(x, y) := h(x, x, y) = h(pr 2 1 (x, y), pr 2 1 (x, y), pr 2 2 (x, y)). Obviously, g is a binary conservative polymorphism of Γ ; moreover, for every two-element subset B ⊆ A, if h↾ B ∈ {∧ (3) , ∨ (3) }, then g↾ B ∈ {∧, ∨}. ⊓ ⊔
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 4. According to Theorem C, a set X of feasible evaluations is a uniform possibility domain if and only if there is a ternary aggregatorf = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) such that each f j is a weak near-unanimity operation, i.e., for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m} and for all x, y ∈ X j , we have that f j (x, y, y) = f j (y, x, y) = f j (y, y, x).
As in the proof of Theorem 3, we can go back-and-forth between X and the set X, whereX = { ((x 1 , 1) , . . . , (x m , m)) | (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ X}, and verify that X is a uniform possibility domain if and only ifX has a ternary, conservative, weak near-unanimity polymorphism. Theorem E and Lemma 3 then imply that the existence of such a polymorphism can be tested in polynomial time, and that such a polymorphism can be produced in polynomial time, if one exists.
In this paper, we gave polynomial-time algorithms that take as input a set X of feasible evaluations and determine whether or not X is a possibility domain and a uniform possibility domain. In these algorithms, it is assumed that the set X of feasible evaluations under consideration is given to us explicitly, i.e., X is given by listing all its elements. It is natural to ask how the complexity of these problems may change if X is given implicitly via a succinct representation. This scenario occurs frequently in other areas of social choice and, in particular, in judgment aggregation, where X is identified with the set of satisfying assignments of a Boolean formula (for surveys on judgment aggregation, see [10, 13] ).
The work reported here assumes that the aggregators are conservative, an assumption that has been used heavily throughout the paper. There is a related, but weaker, notion of an idempotent (or Paretian) aggregatorf = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) where each f j is assumed to be an idempotent function, i.e., for all x ∈ X j , we have that f (x, . . . , x) = x. Clearly, every conservative aggregator is idempotent. In the Boolean framework, idempotent aggregators are conservative, but, in the non-Boolean framework, the converse need not hold. It remains an open problem to investigate the computational complexity of the existence of non-dictatorial idempotent aggregators in the non-Boolean framework.
